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THE POPULATION QUESTIO~ IN NORTHEAST BRAZIL:

ITS ECONOMIC

AND IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
Hf!rman E. Daly*
Yale University
Louisiana State Uni-.•ersi ty
"The rich get richer e::.i:1 the poor get children."
"A m~~a do pobre

e escassa,

- Anonymous

m::.s o lei to de mis~ria ~ fecundo." - Anonymous

I. Introductio n. - l'he Brazilian Northeast with its 27 million people, its

area of 1.5 million square kilometers, and its per capita annual income of
around 150 dollars, is perhapo the poorest "country" in the Western Hemisphere.

1

2 3
Efforts to develop the region fall into two broad historlcal epochs. •

First the ~~hyd.:aulic" epoch in which major emphasis was given to fighting
the periodic droughts, which were taken as the main cause of backwardnes s.
This is sometimes called DNOCS period, after the principal and most recent
institution responsible for carrying out hydraulic pollcies (Departamen to
Nacional de Obras a S~ca).

Second, the present "capital-tec hnology-pla nning"

epoch in which emphasis is not on the drought (which at times was as much a
scapegoat and pork'barrel as a scourge), but on low capital formation,
backwardnes s of technology, and lack of planning of cevelopment efforts.
*The author was (1967-68) Ford Foundation Visiting Professor of economics
at the Federal University of Ceara in Brazil. The views presented in this
paper are entirely his own and do not necessarily reflect those of either
of the above-menti oned inst:l.t-;__\tions. All translation s from Portuguese are
the author's.
Tn/:1,nks are due my students for many stimulating debates, and to the
Cavalcante for his helpfulness e.nd hospitality . Also I
late Dr. Ari d.e
am grateful for comments re.ceived in a seminar at the Fundacao Get6lio
Vargas a:n.d fro:::i. numr,~:i:ous colleagues who read an earlier drE:ft. Once again,
my views do not necesDarily reflect theirs. Many of the ideas discussed
here are also ccnsidered j_n rey paper, "Desenvolvim ento EconOmico e o Problema
Demografico no Nordeste Br::i.z:lleiro" in the Revista Bra$ileira de Economia,
December 1968 o

Sa
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This change in emphes is occurre d in the 1950's and marked the beginn ing

what we might call the SUDENE period after the institu tion respon sible for
do
stimul ating and plannin g investm ent (Superi ntenden cia ~esen volvim ento
Nordes t~).

4 The purpose of this paper is to argue the need for (and the

embryo nic beginn ing of) a third develop mental epoch of "popul ation-p olicy"
(mainly fertili ty contro l).

It i s ~ sugges ted that popula tion policy shc~li

replace the ce.pita l-techn ology·· plannin g efforts nny more than the latter
replace d concern with the drough ts.

But a change of emphas is is needed ,

on
becaus e, althoug h popula tion policy is obviou sly not a suffici ent conditi
for develop ment, it is shown below to be a necessa ry conditi on.

SUDENE

ent,
used to have a popula tion studies divisio n in its human resourc es departm
but it was abolish ed some time ago and presen tly SUDENE seems to have little
intere st in the popula tio~ questio n.
The popula tion explos:!.on has given the Northe ast a natura l rate of
all
popula tion increas e of arou!1d 3.1% annual ly, compared to about 3.2% for

of Brazil , which is among the highes t in the world for popula tions of compar
5

This rate of 3.1% results from the familia r post-w ar pattern of
6
and
a high, constan t crude birth rate (4.7% or 4.8% annual ly) with a lower
7 The death rate will
declini ng crude death rate (1.6% or 1.7% annual ly).

able size.

likely fall to the SJo Paulo level of o.9% fairly rapidly as a result of
8
mass inocula tions-- even smallpo x has not yet been eH.oin ated. ,rthus·: in~the
near future the already high growth rate is almost sure to rise, approa ching
4%.

Histor ically the Northe ast has been "the region of demographic over

flow par excelle nce," showing a strong ly negativ e net migrati on balanc e,
9 This outflow has
while all other regions show positiv a net balanc es.
the
brough t the net growth rate of the region down to about 2.2% annual ly for

71

342
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,.

,..
decade 1950-1960.

10

Net out-migration represents a transfer of uealth,

hu:r.an capital, and laborers of productive ape out of the rep.ion, thus in
creasinp; the dependency ratio.

It is not so r~uch a lesseninn: of population

pressure as a costly result of that pressure.

In 1872 the Hortheast con

tained 47% of the Brazilian population, ,-1hile in 1960 it contained only
foreign
11
32%.
This change is accounted for by a r,reater,,\immiiration to the South,
as well as by continuous internal ri.igration fror the i!orthoast to the South,
0

and to a lesser extent to the Fest.
In addition to the

□over::ent

southward there has been a tremendous rdr,ra

tion from the interior oo the coastal cities of the l':ortheast.

~Jhile the

3 .1% r,routh rate ui 11 double the population of the repion in less than 23
years, the coastal cities, such as Fortaleza uith its p;rowth rate
6,6%, will double their ponulations in about a decade.

12

of

Hhen ue consider

that this rapid doublinr, wi 11 p:reatly increase the proportion of the poor,
illiterate, and younp, in the cities (due to miprations of poor illiterates
from the interior, the hiPher b:1.rth rate of the r,oorer c ass, and the in,..
herent tendency for a hiph birtL rate to produce a younp- populationl·then we can see t-1hat Brazilain sociolop:ists VJean uhen they sey that the
cities have "s·,mllen" rather rhan p:rown (cidades inchadas). Hhen He further
consider that this swellinr> presents not only problems of urban risine
expectations, hir;her per capita investment for urban than for rural infra
truGture, political stability and lnw encorcenent,

13

but also threatens

a breakdown of precarious public health conditions and facilitates the
spread of epidemics--it then becomes clear that this suelling is building
up to an ecological explosion.
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In spite of these facts, and in spite of the moral argument that every
child should be a wanted child, the population growth rate is currently
treated ~s a semi-sacred constant of nature, a parameter, not a variable in
the development effort.

In fact,

11

public opinion" in the Northeast is

very hostile to population policy, even though birth control is widely

practiced by the upper cla3s,

To better understand this tragically para

doxical si.tuation is one of the goals of what follows.

In section II

we will ccnsider th8 economics of the population question, arguing objectively
and in detail thet population control is sine qua non of economic development for the region.*

In section III we will delve into the ideology and

polemics of the populaUon question, arguing that nationalism, communist
influence, and the short-~un interests of the oligarchy are even greater
obstacleo to population policy than the still significant opposition of
traditional Ce.tholicism.

A few conclusions are added in section IV.

To

facilitate relati.ng the case of Northeast Brazil to the general world issue
of population control and economic development, frequent reference will be
made to the excellent survey of recent literature on this subject by Goran

Ohlin of the OECD. 14
II.

The economics, ,of the population question. - For our purposes we need

only the simplest analytical framework for relating income growth to population

growth.

The following form~la converts the Harrod-Damar relationship (upon

which the body of contempor;,r:t growth theory is based) 15 to a per capita
basis by substracting population ,growth. 16
r

*

*The appc,:,.dix is
of sect:f.on II.

=

s - p
k

a more rigorous restatement of some of the points

-5-

where, r = annual per capita rate cf growth in value of real output.
s = annual net savings (capital formation) as a percentage of

annual output.
k = marg:!.,:,_al capital-output ratio.
p = annual rate of population growth •
.Th~ ratios can be expressed as 6C (C
y

= capital

stock, Y

= annual

output), and k as 6C, so that .! becomes 6~ which is th e rate of growth of
6Y
k
Y
total output or ~.ncomc. Thus the formuln simply says that the per capita income
growth rate equals (approximctely)

17

the total income growth rate (expressed

as.!) minus the population growth rate.

According to our simple equation

k

an increase in r can occur in only three ways:
lowering p.

raising s; lowering k; or

It is argued below that the first two alternatives have been

rather fully exploited, and that reducing pis presently the only effective

way to increaser for the Northeast.
Let us look more closely at each of these three variables.
The ~'atio

~

is the percentage of total income saved (somewhere) and

invested (in the region), and depends not only on ability to abstain
from consumption, but also on the ability to transfer what. is not

consumed from savers to investors, which further presupposes the existence
of a class of pe,::,ple who invest other people's money.

otltside tb.3 reg:'..-:··.1 th~.fl clac ., '. is .!: fortiori ne~essary>.

When savings come from
Thus s •is

a sociological ratio which depends on the willingness and ability to save
(including income distribution) and on the efficacy of financial institut
ions which transfer savings to a presumed class of entrepreneurs, be
they private or governm~nta16

The rc~io k reflects the state of technology, management,. the
availability of fa.cto~:s other th,m c~pite.l, and the length of the working
day of capital.

It i5 the total produc~ivity of capital (differential)

rather then the m2rgin~l product (partial derivative).

In the first

h1
' ,.., .. ) "'''"'
(1.. ::m d , 1 aov...
t-- adJ"ust while in the second
,_
~ .. ~ f'·,-ee
case o th sr f ac~crs

case they are held constant, as one more unit of capital is added.

k

has units of yea.::-i:,,~': bcin13 cnentially a pay-out--fie:.::;'..cJ--i.e •. the· number of
years it t&!:::eG fer a doll.::.·.: 1 s cxt'i:'2. invastL':<::n-:: to generate an extra
dollar of naticnal ir.come.

The reciproc&l of k has the same units as

the interest rate and m.::y be thought of a a "nat-icnal interest rate"
expressing the e:mu::J. l'ate. of retu:::-n or, the extra dollar invested, or
the percentage of th':} u.::ra doll2.r' s investment recouped :-.n one. year.

The

"national intc~~cGt rate" :!.s grec.te~· than the ordinary interest rate received
by the bdividual ce.p'.:ialiGt, by an amount reflecting externalities and
multiplier effcctG.

k f.s oftc·,1 treated as a purely technological variable,

but its intcrp;:·"!!:atio:i. .::.s a r-2yout period or national interest rate reminds
us of its t•sycholog:i.cal t:!.m~~•pre:forence side.

k may differ between two

societies with i(~cntlc.al t0dmolcgical possibilities because of differing

ments with th;; lo;..rest k, oo for aay given level of investment k will be
equal in the tw'J si)cieties.

Bt~t one will feel it worthwhile to invest

more, th2:::eby pt.•.'oh5.ng the Lw.rgin out further and incurring a higher k.
The question of uhc·:: dctermin-ss th::: time-preference or time horizons of a
people is beyc:.~J the Dcope of thii:, pnper, except for one important influence•

*k =

~c

1.G

a CD!:'.J:".8~ :!.n a

stock divj_ded by a change in a flow,

where t -J.s

tin;.,3

...tl

6$/t

hY
r.1~a.s1..2rcd in y0.arsn

~

t,
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In a pre-dcmog:r·.::;:,hic transition society (equilibrium with high birth and
death rates) th3 avernge length of life is short, while in a post-transition
society (equiU.bdu::i ~11th low birth and death rates) the average length of
life is long.

For e:::a.nplc, birth and death rates of

40 /1000 annually imply

an average age at death equal to the reciprocal, 1000 /40 = 25 years.
birth and death ~ates fall to
rises to l000/20 = 50 years.

20

If

/1000 ennually, the average age at death

A society in which the average length of life

is 50 years is U!,cely to h2ve both a longer time horizon and a lower dis
count of the future than a society in which the average length of life is
only 25.

It will accept and consider profitable investments with a longer

pay-out period (higher k) ~nd will be more capital intensive.

Thus k

would seem to have a tendency to increase with life expe.ctancy, given the
state of technology.
The rate p he3 been explained by biological theories, cultural theories,
and economic theori.es, all of which are relevant and none of which are
~ f actory. 18
compete
1
1y sat,.s

Perhaps the best generalization about popula•

tion growth is that set forth by Ezra Bowen (An Hypothesis of Population
Growth): "population size tends to vary directly with aggregate wealth, and
inversely with the hei;ght of standards of living."

The first clause is

simply a rcstate:;;3nt of the biological law that all life tends continually
to press

0:1

the r,,ei:ms of subsistc1nce.

Since for all animals except man,

living standards are constant and uniform, it follows that greater means
of subsistence (wealth) leads to greater numbers existing at the same
standard of living~

The unique quality of man is that hi.s living standards

are neither constant over time nor uniform throughout the population.

To

the extent the~ each person enjoys a higher standard of living, or that one
class enjoys a higher standard, then fewer people can exist on any given

-8-

aggregate income.

I~ the Northeast we shall see that the first clause,

that relevant to animal population, applies to the lower class, while the
second, specifically human clause, applies to the upper class. For our
purposes we need not further discuss the various "laws" of population
growth.

It is enough to note that these "laws" can be altered by conscious

policy, as witnessed by the history of Ireland, Japan, Taiwan, and other
countries.

'"'

Although ocJ: formula identifies only three determinants .of growth per

"

capita income, ee.ch of these three depends in tum on a whole host of i nfluences.

The domains of the variables s,k, and p must, if the formula is

to have any economic relev&nce,be considerably smaller than the field of

real numbers, the limits being supplied by those myriad socio-economic
factors which <lo not directly enter the formula.

For example psychology

and income distribution and capitalist institutions are such thats is
generally less than 20%, technology work habits, and time preference are
such that k is esually between 2 and 6 years, and biology and "culture"
almost always k8cp p between 0% and 4%.

Hence we speak meaningfully of the

"savings potential" the "capacity to absorb capital or technology" or the
"natural birth and death rate limits" under certain general levels or
styles of r:: tviH:,:aticn.

In other words our simple formula becomes quite

comprehensive wrc,n ,Jc try to specify the domains of the variables, and
unless we know Eomething about these domains we do not know what we are talk
ing about.*

Wh.st I wish to suggest is that the Northeast is already oper-

*Otherwise we could let k approach zero or let s become large (though not
over 100% in e closed economy) and attain an r as large as we wish without
worrying nbuut: ·p,.. 1f <'ourrie.~ "eHm::.nat:'...'.1g" the population proolem· in- this,•:W;:ly
also "eliin:!.nat:~3 11 the economic problem.
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ating at its cep~city to abcoLb capital and technology {resulting in a high
rate of growth), but is a lonJ way from its capacity to reduce population
growth.

Furthormore the hir;h population growth is the main social limit

holding dcwn the capacity to ubso;.:b capital and technology, and the savings
potential~

It is also the factor which keeps per capita income growth in

the Northeast from rcp1·esenting cbvelopmcnt--which leads to a "swollen

economy" as well as swollen citie::i.
The average capital-output ratio for industry in the Northeast is
estimated by Hirschman to be cbout 2.5. 19

Singer

gives a similar estimate

(for 1950) for the state of Ccara (2.73 for industry; 2.07 for agriculture). 20
Chenery ar..d Strout estimate k for Brazil as a whole, during the high growth
period of 1956-60, at 2.64.

21

The figure 2.5 is lm-1 by international

comparison, and reflects th-:, predo.:ninance of light industry.
industry follows we would expect it to rise in the future.

If heavy
According

to Kuznets, non~ of the ten d::weloped countries which he studied has in

the last century had a marginal capital-output ratio less than 3. 22
man's

Hirsch

est1.mate oi 2.5 was for the average ratio, so the marginal ratio may

be a bit higher.

Also population growth necessitates infrastructure invest

ments in schools, roeds, houses, end public services, which have higher capital
output ratios th2n indnstry a.nd agr:lculture. Furthermore, to the extent
that increasing life e~~pect,,:1cy dim:!.nishes the time preference discount
applied to the future~ we would expect k to rise.

Let us assume, then, that

2.5 is a reasonable estimate~ and that it in probably very nt~r the lower limit

of k's domn:ina--i.e. r cannot likely be increased by lowering k, at least
not very much,

2D.d

not over the long run.

In fact, it appeai:s likley that
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k will tend to rise.
However, as Lauchlin Currie (Accelerating Development) has pointed out,
it may be possible to extend k's domain downward by the relatively facile
social change of lengthening the working day of capital by working shifts
around the clock, thereby employing previously idle labor and increasing
output of needed goods.

k is measured in years, not hours.

the number of hours worked per year we would halve k.

By doubling

Moreover we would

also halve the average capital-output ratio and cash in on a one-shot gain
from the increased productivity of intra-marginal units of capital.

This

assumes that the extra output could be sold, but with Keynesian policies
to stimulate aggregate demand this should be possible.

Such a policy

should certainly be pursued, but several limitations will keep us from
expecting too much from this in the Northeast.
are already working shifts.

First, some industries

Second, the strategy works only for physical

capital, not for human capital or skilled labor, which need leisure.

This

limits it to physical capital requiring mainly unskilled labor for its
operation.

Unfortunately it is human capital and skill which is most

responsible for growth and which is in shortest supply in the Northeast.
Third, the strategy is relevant mainly to industry which accounts for only
12% of the value of output in the Northeast.

It is generally not relevant

to agriculture because the seasonality of production cannot be rushed.

It

is generally not relevant to services since this sector depends mainly on
human capital.

It is doubtful that lengthening the working day of physical

capital in industry will be sufficient to offset the higher capital-output
ratios of demographic investments in education and infrastructure.

-11-

Without regional income accounts no one can say for sure whats is,
22 and from the
but thanks to savings from the South under law 34/18,
exterio!, · it is cle'lr th.tit· i::.vestnen t funds are nbt .:t lir.ittng factor.

,\lso

the unequal distribut ion of income and the luxury consumpti on of the rich
further testify to the existence of a large savings potential .

That the

limit is capa._ci. ty to absorb .:t..s also indicated by the 2-to 3-year. lag be.tween
24 (Since funds unused
availabil ity of 34/18 funds and their disbursem ent.

for 3 years revert to the federal treasury, the existence of unused funds
is itself a spur to finding uses for them).

In an interview with ten

conemists of the Bank of the Northeast the opinion was unanimous that the
bottlenec k in the Northeast is capacity to absorb capital, nor shortage
of funds.

In other words sis at the upper limit of its domain.

Thus

if raising sand lowering k are both no longer effective in increasin g r,
that leaves lowering p as the only temaining ail.ternati ve. '
But perhaps the Northeast is growing fast enough.

r?

What is the current

And why does growth represent swelling rather than developme nt?

Un

fo-rtunate ly in the absence of regional accounts we can only guess at r.

The best source of informati on is the Bank of the Northeast whose president ,
'

(

I

Rubens Costa, published some figures for 1959-64 showing industria l growth
25
If we
to be 7.4% annually, and agricultu ral gTowth to be about 6.2%.
take a weighted average of these rates, using the percentag e of total

I

output estimated to originate in industry (12%) and in agricultu re (42%)

I

as weights,

(

26

we get a growth rate of about 6. 5% for that 54% of total

output coming from agricultu re and industry.

We might assume that the

remaining 46% in the service sector increased output at the same rat·e, which

-12-

may err on the high side, since services include government and the
bureaucrat:f.c sector.

Howcve:;:, for the country as a whole the money value

of primary and secondary c~tput increaf.cd by a factor about 3.5 between
1962 and 1964, while V.!!.lue of tertic.ry output increased by a factor of
3.2.

27

Ass\~mir.g no differer.t:ial effect of inflation our hypothesis of equal

growth is roughly ve;:ified for the country as a whole, and does not seem

unreasonnble for the Northeast.
income increased nt 3.4% (6.5

If this 6.5% is correct then per capita

3.1).

A partial check on these estimates is to see what vc:.lue of s, they imply. Sub
stituting in the formula (3.4 = s - 3.1) gives ans of about 16%. As
2.5
already indicated regional estimates of s are not available, but for the
nation as a wholes is about 15.7% for 1961-64.

28

If we assume that the

rate of capital formation for the. Northeast has attained equality with the

national average, then all our other figures are consistent.

There is one

"if" too many here, but it is not an unreasonable "if," and we can conclude
that 6 to 7% is the correct orde:r of magnitud_e, vhich is all we need.

A

lower rate would give added strength to future argument, while a higher rate
would only slightly weaken the basic conclusions.

A rate of 6 or 7% is not

only high by international comparison, but is also higher than the growth
. 1 post-war year.
· any singe
ra t e f or Brazil as awho 1e in

29

Ch enery an d

Strout consider 6 to 7% as a maximum likely rate of grm·1th for underdevelop
ed countries.

30

Our .;;,ssumptfon that this rate will be maintained is therefore

an optimistic one.
It appears then that total income is rising much faster than population
for the No~theast,

(Although the opposite is true for Brazil as a whole

since during 1960-64 output grew at 2.1% while the population grew at 3.1%).

31
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But before we rejoice over the likelihocd the.t regional per capita income
1s rising at 3.4% (well above the Punta del Este goal of 2.5%!) and hastily
conclude that the population explosi:m is not a special threat to the
Northeast (as is usually dc;ne), let us pause to go behind these misleading
averages.
With an income distribution as skewed as that of the Northeast
the ari'thmetic m~.:m income for the t~hole population iu just a number, which,
although it may represent n goal or a possibility, does not describe any
central tendency.

The great majority of people have incomes well below

the mean, and a few have incomes va:Jtly above the mean.

Modal income is

a better index of central tendency or "representativeness," and there is
no evidence that modnl income has increased,

I know of no one who claims

that it is increasing now, and there are good reasons for believing that
a typical lower class family (which would be a modal for the entire population) is not getting any bette1· off.

In the first place, lower class ·total

income is surely growing more slowly than upper class total income (or
total income of both classes), since the lower class is hurt more by in
flation, has no education or bargaining power, and "it takes money to make
money."

The last is especially true since Law 34/18 means that nordestinos

who have money can easily trobilize more--the credit multiplier is around
6, and by combinj_ng SUDEN:E fonds with those of state development agencies,
can be as high as 16.
both increased by 6.5%,

But evE:n if lower and upper class total incomes
the lower class per capita income (a mean which

is a good approximatfon to the mode a.nd thus representative of central
tendency) would stay about the same while that of the upper class would
double.

i

This ~·esults from the fact that a typical upper (and middle) class

-14-

completed family has about 4 children, while a typical lower class completed
family has about 8._

32

The upper class family with a reproduction ratio of

2*, and the lower class femily with a reproduction ratio of 4, will thus
double and quadruple their numbers, respectively, over one generation**
(about 25 years).

If we make the generous assumption that the total

income of each class increases at the same 6.5% rate at which the total
income of both classes (the whole population) increases, then over 25
years the total income of each class will have increased by a factor of
(1.065)

25

=

4.8.

Hence upper class per capita income will increase by a

factor of 4.8 = 2.4 per generation~ while the lower class per capita income
2
will increase by a factor of 4. ~= = L 2 per generation. Since we can be
4
sure that lower class total j_ncome grows at less than" and upper class total - income at more than, the 6.5% average, we may conclude that upper
class per capita income more than doubles over a generation, while lower
class per capita income remains about constant, or perhaps even declines.
A constant or declining lower class per capita income is consistent with
the regions net outmigration.

Since the poor live close to subsistence the

"elasticity of migration" with respect to a fall in income must be high,
although there are certainly other motives for migration besides falling
income.

These calculations do not pretend to great accuracy or demograpptc

refinement, but they suffice to estcblish the strong presumption that in
Northeast Brazil "the rich get richer and the poor get children."

The

social consequences of this venerable dictum deserve vastly more emphasis

*This 11 1 eprCduction" ratio is treated as net of infant mortality, but
gross with respect to other mortality -- i.e. the number of children surviv
ing infant mortality divided by the numbe.:- of parents.
**A generation is equal to the mean age of mothers at childbirth.

-15-

than is usually accorded them.

Furthermo re it follows that the percentag e

of the populatio n getting richer is getting smaller, and the percentag e
getting children is getting larger--i .e. the populatio n is being "prolet
arianized ."

(See Appendix) .

In addition to its common-sense appeal the above argument correspon ds
very well with W. Arthur Lewis' model of developme nt with unlimited supplies
33
Lewis explains growth as the result of technolog ical change
of labor.
and especiall y capital accumulat ion resulti~g from a rise in the savings
ratio from around 5% to around 15%.

This rise is made possible by an

increasin g concentra tion of income in the hands of the capitalis t sector
(the only sector which saves), 'Which in turn ,1-e made possible by a constant
real wage resulting from unlimited supplies of labor.

However in the Lewis

model one presumes that excess labor will eventuall y be absorbed and real
wages will rise, while for the Northeast unlimited labor seems a
permanent

condition assured by the unlimited reproduct ion of the proletari at.

Even a very respectab le growth rate of 6.5% does not begin to arrest the
proletari anization of the populatio n.

Lewis also assumes that the capital

ist wage rate must be higher (by about 30%) than per capita income (average
product) in subsisten ce agricultu re in order to induce migration to the
city (capitali st sector).

This differenc e is not necessary in the Northeast

since migration to the cities has occurred at a rate much superior to the
needs of the capitalis t sector.

Aside from these two exception s the North•

east correspon ds quite well to the Lewis model, with SUDEHE playing the

.I
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role of spark plur, of the capitalist sector.*
It certainly a!_)pears that a population policy is called for if the
masses are to share in the benefits of groHth.

But rii~ht there not exist

the possibility of increasinr capacity to absorb capital and technology,
Certainly, but above all else this Hill

thereby increasinz s and r?

require education, and a rapid population rrowth increases the prooortion
of children, uhich throus a preater burden on the already insufficient edu
cational system, as well as increasing the dependency ratio and maLinp; it
harder to save.

As of 1960, for Brazil as a t~ole 43% of the population

was under 15 years of ape (versus 30% in Argentina and the U.S., and 22%
in Sweden), and the nercentare may be .hi~her for the Northeast, in vieu
of its higher birth and death rates, although hidier infant T".Ortality rates
tend to reduce the dependency ratio.

34

In 1920 llterates (15 and older)

constituted 14.2% of the population of the Northeast; 15.4% in 1940; 17.7%
in 1950; and 15.4% in 1960.

35

In other words literacy has been about

constant for the last 40 years, and has actually declined since 1950.
Literacy efforts were frustrated by por>ulation increase.

This phenor:ienon

is even more strikinr, in the cities due to the irnmipration of illiterates
from the interior.

In Fortaleza the literacy rate (5-14 af>,e r,roup) fell

from 57.6% in 1940 to 39.4% in 1950, and has probably fallen f..::.J:'~:~"..tr

'''The international implications of unlimited reproc1uctior. in soMe
countries and limited reproduction in others uould, as in the case of the
Lewis roodel, be analogous to the differential class effects Hi thin the
country. Countries ~-,ith unlimited reproduction uoulrl find that technolo
gical improvements ~10uld not take the form of higher vages, but would take
the forn either of hi?:her returns to capital, or loPer prices of the pro
duct in the latter case leadinr- to a worseninf of the terms of trade vis
a vis countries with lit!lited reproduction.
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since 1950. 36 Kuznets simply echoes common knowledge when he reminds us that
"widespread use of scientific technology is impossible without a lit.erate
population ••• 3711

Yet education has fallen from 11% of the federal budget

in 1965 to 7.7% in 1968.

38

Capacity to absorb capital and technology depends

mainly on the r.uality of the po~ulntion, not quentity.

Since qua~tity

increases have opportcnity c:::Gts in terms of the quality of the population,
they tend to hold dcwn the capacity to absorb capital end technology, and
thus to hold dot-m improvemcn ts in s and k.
In addition to being concerned with domains of variables, we must also
look for "behind the scenes" interrelations not evident in our simple formula.
Two such relations come to mind.

First k is influenced by the availability

of factors other than capital, so if labor were in short supply a high p would
me.an an (eventual) easing of the labor shortage thus making possible a lower
ing of k.

However, since unskilled labor is superabundant in the Northeast

we can ignore this possibility.

Secondly, and much more importantly, a

high p gives a structural impulse to inflation, thereby distorting invest
ment toward more sped.dative, less productive alternatives (raisini; k), and
perhaps also tending to hold cuwn savings (reduce s), both of which would
have a negative effect on r.

It is possible of course that inflation might

increase e by bringing about a further concentration of income, but this is
still, on balance, an unhappy influence.
from a high p comes about in two ways.

The structural impulse to inflation
For one, a high p (with a high

birth rate) means that the young dependent cohorts are adding more people
each year than are the older productive cohorts.

Thus demand (or need) for

commodities tends to grow faster than production or supply.

This age effect
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is reinforce d by the hlgher reproduct ion ratio of the more needy and less
productiv e lower clas.J~

Further reinforcem ent comes through the fiscal

system since the abslou.te :.l.ncrca;Ja within the tm~ay:Lag cohorts is less
than tha a.1:,:Joicte. increase

~:1.

the cchorts demanding o::: needing govemmen t

services St!ch as schools, ;:u:1lic hs.ilth, and welfare.

Very likely the

governmen t will find itself forced to run an inflation ary deficit.*
The p.~pulatio a qaestion b~comes more acute when c:1e ree.1.izes that in all

developc-~ cou.:1.trL,s a 0 :ricultuY,; h2s been a "dlse!!lplo yer" of lab:::,r as it
becomes more productiv e.

The existence of surplus people and low wages

makes technical advance in agricultu re app8ar uneconomi c in the short run,
thus slowing dow:-:i. forn:,;1tion of the large agricultu ral su:;;,lus cpon which
industria lization ultimatel y depends.

Furthermo re in industry as well

there is a tendency for ncH tech:iolog ies to be highl:,T automc:ted and thus
provide a relctivcl y small amount of employme nt--~nd that for educated
people.

Si.nee the. woxke::-:J of the. I'.3Xt 20 years have alreedy been born,

this problem will not be alleviate d by birth control for quite some time.
This harcly co::.11Jtitu tes an a:i:-g:m1cnt ega::nst birth control, although it is
often mention~d in tha.t context··- rather it means that populstio n control
should have been init:l.ated !:wenty years ago.

Also, we must not forget that

at an indi.vid1.1d level there is an ii;:media!:e r!nd ir.':'~timab le benefit to be

gained by the lcwer cll!ss fro-:n L:j_rth control.

To say that the parents of ten

*I c~ greteful to Professor Is~ac Kerctende zky for celling this to
my atteation .

fl
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hungry children really want five more, is, paraphrasing Nanc, to commit
libel on the hu~a~ race.

Also the Northeast's infant mortality rate in

excess of 174 per thousand (versus 70 per thousand in Sao Peulo)

39

argues

for the relevence to both familir.s and whole populations of what Boulding
has called the "utte:d.y d:!.smal theorem" of econcmics--viz.

if nothing is

done to control fOpulation the ultimate result of any increase in productivity
will be to allow more people (the reserve army of dying infants) to subsist
40
at the se.me level, thus incr~asing the sum total of huu1an misery"
Granted the benefits of population policy, what are the costs, and is it
really feasible in Northeast Brazil?

Stephen Enke calculates that the

current margin, funds spent on birth control in an underdeveloped country are
about 100 times more effective in raising per capita income than funds
spent on conventional development projects.

41 After critically reviewing

the calculations of Enke aud others, and the highly simplified assumptions
underlying them, Ohlin nevertheless concludes,
"What is worth emphasizing is that it is difficult to undertake
any calculations of economic gains that might be realized from popu
lation control which does not point to very spectacular benefits.
On the other hand it is currently believed that successful family
planning campaigns can be achieved at costs which are extremely low,
except in comparison with the negligible amounts spent so far. The
purely economic case is convincing--so convincing that one is tempted
to say that population control might bring the dawn of sui:;t2ined
11
ecor.onic growth within sight of the developing countrie.s.
The f~,asib::.7.~.ty o:: bi::-,::h cc~~.'::rol. ii.1.

t)::.e

Northeaut ic gcncrnlly con-

sidered nil, end one the few studies of the region's demographic problems

dismisses the possibility as "still very remote."

43

'Nevertheless the practice

of family planning is wldespread among the upper class, and to say that the
poor do not want birth control is true only in the same sense that they do
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not ~•want" to go to school.

Recent studies indicate that in urban

Brazil over 93% of all families having 3 or more children do not want more.

44

Another significant finding is that 71. 3% of Catholic women in legal or
common-law marriage in Rio de Janeiro have used contraception before the
fourth pregnancy.

45

Nost significant of all is the estimate of Professor

Rodr1s~es Lima that (in public hospitals) 22.3 cases were treated for the
46 Furthermore
effects of induced abortion, for every 100 live births.
most loluntariyy induced abortions occur outside hsspitals.

This figure

corresponds with results of studies in Santiago, Chile, where it was
found that the ratio of prov..ked abortion to live births was 23%, and that

26% of women of reproductive age admitted to a history of provoked
47 The contention that people, as individuals, do not want birth
abortion.
control is a myth.
To sum up, Northeast Brazil should adopt a population policy (emphasiz
ing fertility control) for the following reasons:
(1) Without it modal income is unlikely to increase (likely to decline),
which means that the benefits of growth will not extend to the masses, who
will form an ever larger percentage of the population.
(2) It will greatly reduce the burden of educating the masses, a pre
condition for modern technology as well as democracy.- Indeed, without popu
lation control the percentage of illiterates will probably continue to in
crease.
(3)
ratio.

It will increase the savings potential by lowering the dependency

(4) It will facilitate the introduction of high-productiv ity methods in
agriculture which are not feasible with surplus farm population and low wages.
Likewise for industrial automation. Alternatively it will mitigate the pro
blems of technological unemployment when automated methods become more
economical than even subsistence labor.
(5)

It is necessary to keep the swollen cities from bursting.
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(6) The lower class wants birth control, although not articulately,
and the upper class already practices it.
(7) A dollar spent on birth control is, at the current margin, vastly
more productive in raising per capita income t. an a dollar spent on conven
tional development projects.
(8) Ultimately birth and death rates will be brought inexorably into
equality. Without some form of birth limitation, death rates will rise to
equal the birth rate at around 48/1000, implying an average length of life
of 21 years, with a corresponding high rate of tine preference and low level
of capital intensity, and general poverty. 1lhy not .lower the b:trth rate instead?
(9) The region is unable to support its present population as evidenced
by high emigration, illiteracy, disease, and infant mortality rates.

(10) A high birth rate gives an impulse to structural inflation, which
reacts unfavorably on k ands.
The list could be extended but it already presents a highly convincing
case which one would expect to command general agreement.* Nevertheless the

*Among modern Western economists from developed countries the most
sanguine views of the influence of population growth on development are
probably held by Albert Hirschman and Colin Clark, especially the latter,
Hirschman points out that the skills developed to meet the challenge
of a population explosion are the same skills necessary for development.

This is a rather obvious variation on the theme of "challenge and response,"
The same observation was made and developed in greater detail by Sir William
Temple in 1673 as an explanation of why the densely populated Dutch were more
prosperous than the English (see E.S. Furniss, The Position of the Laborer
in a System of Nationalism, p. 139). Also one might argue that the prudence
and foresight required by birth control are very useful habits for develop
ment. The most important thing to note about Hirschman's observation is that
from a policy viewpoint nothing follows fror.1 it.Underdeveloped countries are
already long on challenge and short on response--an additional challenge~ e.g,
bombing them, is really not going to help. Nor will the population explosion.
Hirschman himself draws no policy implications from his statement, but it is
widely quoted by those with pro-natalist views.
In the preface to his book Population and Land Use, Colin Clark recognizes
that high population growth brings economic h4rdship to communities living
by traditional agriculture, "but it is the only force powerful enough to make
such communities change their methods, and in the long run transforms them
into much more advanced and productive societies." This is really an incred
ible statement. Are we to believe that all modernization of agriculture has
resulted from population pressure? tJhy is not China's or India's agriculture
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SUDENE policy has concentra ted on s and k, treating p as a parameter .
have had

They

considera ble success in this strategy as witnessed by the high rates

of "growth" (i.e. swelling) in both total and per capita income, but the
strategy itself is insuffici ent for developm ent--if by developme nt we mean
increasin g the welfare of the majority of the populatio n.

This can be

further shown in a ro•.!gh empirical way by taking as estimates of future s
and k the 11'.0St favorable va:ues found by Kuznets to have prevailed over the
last century in the ten ind'L'.:Jtrial countries he studied.

k = 3 and s = 22%, both for postwar Japan.

48

These were

We know that p will approach

4% as the death rate falls and the birth rate remains constant.
haver= 22 - 4

Thus we

= 3.3%, which we have already seen is insuffici ent to counter-

3

act the effect of different ial fertility and the resulting proletari anization
of the populatio n.

Furtherm~ re it is very doubtful that even the famous

disciplin e of the Japanese could have achieved such ans (and k) had it not
been for their drastic populatio n policy which cut the birth rate in half in
49 It is no accident
only ten years--fro m 34/1000 in 1947 to 17/1000 in 1957.
that the industria l country with the world's highest sand lowest k, should
have at the same time experienc ed the world's most impressiv e fall in p.
Thus even assuming that the Northeast could match the Japanese s and k,
and do it without the help of populatio n policy, it would still not halt
the process of proletari anization :

·more modern than. that· cf the United States, Canada, or Australia'. ? Is
populatio n pressure really :'strong enough"? It has not been in India. The
challen3e of high birth ratro5 has throughou t history generally been met by
the easy response of high death rates, rather than by the difficult response
of moderniza tio::!.;..-"th ou shalt not kill, but needst not strive officious ly to
keep alive." Clark's use of the "long run" here richly deserves Keynes' famous
putdown that "in the long run we are all dead," because in fact the most
common short run response to populatio n pressure is a rise in the death rate,
not the moderniza tion of agricultu re. The latter is rather uncommon even as
a long run response.
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It has perhaps occurred to the reader that if per capita income is
growing at 3.4%, then it is at least arithmetically possible for everyone's
income to grow at 3.4%, add thus double in 21 years.

So if income is re

distributed only proportionally (not equally) so that all per capita incomes
grow at 3.4%, what happens to the population problem?

It is pa:lliated, but

not cured, since nothing physical can for long grow exponentially.

Indeed,

if families received extra income for extra ~hildren, as would have to be
the case in such a plan, population may grow even more rapidly.

There are

many good arguments for redistributing income, but to escape facing the
population question

is not one of them.

On

the contrary, population policy

is itself a most powerful means of effecting income redistribution between
classes.
According to Halthus,
"It is unquestionably true that the laws of private property, which
are the grand sti.mulants to production, do themselves so limit it as always
to make the actual produce of the earth fall very considerably short of
the eower of production. On a system of private property no adequate motive
to the extension of cultivation can exist unless the returns are sufficient
not only to pay the wages necessary to keep up the support of a wife and two
or three children, but also afford a profit on the capital which has been
employed. This necessarily excludes from cultivation a considerable portion
of land which might be made to bear corn. If it were possible to suppose
that man might be adequately stimulated to labor under a system of common
property such land might be cultivated, and the production of food and the
increase of popuattion might go on till the soil absolutely refused to
grow a single additional quarter, and the whole of society was exclusively
engaged in procuring the necessisites of life. But it is quite obvious
that such a state of things would inevitably lead to the greatest degree of
distress and degradation. And if a system of private property secures man
kind from such evils, which it certainly does in a great degree by securing
to a portion of the society of leisure necessary for the progr~ss of the arts
and sciences, it n:ust be allowed that such a check to tg 0 increase of
cultivation confers on society a most signal benefit."
The necessary condition for progress in the arts and sciences i-s leisure,
and the necessary conditions for leisure are unequal distribution of income

~-'.

·:·
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and/or linitation of nopulation to a level such that only that land and
those processes which are productive enough to yield a surplus need be em
ployed.

To the extent that ,re orefer eaual distribution of incoMe, then

population control becor:,es all the nore necessary if ne are to rriaintain
leisure for non-subsistence pursuits.
But if the econonic case for population policy is so stronr, ~,hy has it
not been adopted, and Hhy is it still very stronply resisted?

One very im..

portant reason is sir-rnly lack of infornation anc1. lack of unclerstandinr of the
economic arr.u~ents, ~lus natural inertia.
post-Forld Har II phenoI!'enon.

It is, after all, essentially a

Dut this is far fror, l.einr- the uhole story.

To understand the rest Fe nust turn to the rc2lM of ideolopy.
III.

The i<leolo?v of the population question. - O~l!n says:
"Discussions of population orobler.is inevitably touch on the
intinate spheres of life as ~ell as the ultimate: birth, procreation,
and death. They also evoke seductively simple and often contradictory
notions of the collective fate: a declininp rate of rrm,th evokes the
prospect of decline and extinction; a prmrinf ponulation seems to stre
np-then the tribe or the nation, but excessive nur.1bers lead the thou!"ht
population thou
to famine and hunper. Such basic ideas have dorriinat
e:ht in the .µast, and they remain influential toda.y. n

51

One red herrinp uhich is enevitably dra?,~ed across tr:e path of arpument
is the ir.practibi li ty of "enforcement" of birth control.
deals only ui th voluntary control.

Our discussion

Far fror. liT'litinp anyone's freedeo!!' the

idea is to extend to the lor-rer class the same option enjoyed by the upper
class of limiting and spacinr, their propeny.*

,'<'Ultinately any positive grouth rate Hill lead a oopulation to an ir.ipos
sible size, so that in the very lonp run a zero r:routh rate uill be necessary.
Since current preferences for 3 or 4 children iMply a positive crouth rate,
some conditions restraininr p.irc voluntarism ~ay have to be imposed in the
future·. To discuss this before the case for voluntarism has been won is put
tinr the cart before the horse. Ilefore one can be convinced that all have a
social duty to limit their progeny, one must acceot the prior condition that
all have an individuel rip;ht to do so, and tha.t the excerise of that rip.;ht
does not have anti-social consequence •

..§i
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As rubens Costa notes,
"It is uell kno\-m by everyone that in our country there is
in practice no official control on the production and sale of contra
ceptives. In fact many niddle and upl_)er class urban fatr.ilies limit
births. But rural and lm 1-incorne urban fanilies possess neither the
means nor the inforr.ation for plannin~ the number of children they
wish to have. T:i.us it 1:appens that those uJ-,o can best feed, educate,
and prepare their children for life are the ones who have the fewest
children ••• resultin in a conti~uous deterioratio n in the composition
of the population. "

52

- The relation between "proletaria t" (literally, "those i,ith many off
sprinp") and "proliferati on" is er,,bedded in our very lanruage, anc1 is even
more apparent in Portur,uese (prole, proletariacl o).

Caldas Auletc, the auth-

oritative dictionary of Porturuese, defines "proletario " or proletarian as,
"citizen of the louest class ofa people, tLe class v!1ose members, poor ancl
exelt'pt fror1 taxes, Here useful to the rep~~~lic only for the _-procreation
of G,.hil9_:r~n."

(i'y en1phasis.)

Altl,ouph t!'.is is the .Ancient Por.1an sense of

the word it is by no r1eans obsolete, and as Hi.11 be shOTm later, is more

relevant to the northeast tlum the later !'.arxian T!'eaninp.
\Jhat is the attitude of the "public o,..,inion class" (oliqarcty, studentn,
professiona ls) of the Portheast tmmrd population policy?

To berin with a

personal exper<1ence, durinp- the year of 1967 I discovered that out of my
class of 15 rraduAte students in econonics, fro, all over the lTortheast,
only one favored a policy of makinp- birth control infornation available
to the lm1er class. -:c

Certainly this sar.:)le is far fror. randon, containing

only university rraduates in economics, who presur:,ably have a better than
average understandin g of socio-econo mic prob lens.

iUso the ECLA-!3t-1DE course

,.,However in the 1968 group of nineteen students, six favored sor.1e
minimum population policy and the opposition seemed less intense.
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on the economy of the t1ortheast sim~ly ignored populatio n.

From the 9,000

word summary of their 1967 course r,iven in Fortaleza , one ~10ul<l never r;uess
that there was such a thinr, as a populatio n explosion --althouo, h one does
learn that in the fifteenth century the Turl.:ish invasions created serious
difficult ies for European counerce!

53

One of the leadinr, younp; professor s

of this course told me in a discussio n that he found poi:ulatio n control
"personal ly repu~nant , ancl besides, look at ell the land ue have--T,e need land
not popualtto n control."

reform,

might be desirable .

Hor Fould he accept the idea that both

The proble!'l is not just i~norance .

Durinr April and liay of 1967 t!:ere was a national flare-up a~ainst
U. s. missionar ies in the Anazon, TJho nere supposedl y engap:ec:1 in birth control
education and insertion of IUD' s.

The follot1inp headlines of Ultima Hora

(Fay 4, 1967) shm, the leftist reaction, "national indirnati on a3ainst
11
eenocide in the A.r.,azon, and "steriliz ation destroys morality of Brazilian

women."

I"r. Alberto Panos, P.rchbisho p of Belen, nrotestecl ar;ainst

"steriliza tion" of wonen in the i\nazon and alonf the Delern-Ilr asiliP road
by P-resbyter ian missionar ies, callinr: it "this ne~! slnup:.hter of the ·

I

innocents .

r

of the steriliza tion of Brazilian immen in the J\raazon by Presbyter ian

54

"

Congressw o~an Julia Steinbruc k called for an investiga tion

missiona ries, done "with the sole purpose of depopulat inp those repions,
aiming at, in the not too distant future, an almost authorize d foreign
penetrati on.

1155

A congressi onal investiga tion failed to turn up any evidence

of "steriliz ation" and the more responsib le neuspaper s reacted against the
furor.

56

The incident is sipnifica nt because it shows how sensitive the issue

is and ho,;1 easy it is for the leftist "nationa list" press to play on the
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ripe predisposition of useful innocents.

In fact even a government snallpox

vaccination drive in Ceara provoked rumors spread amomr the masses that
the canpairm uas really an Ar.ierican plot to sterilize the nordestino.
The Heekly maf',azine 1'.anchete

57

reported the results of a 1Jublic

opinion poll (2,800 men and women in seven najor cities), a.s indicating
that 79Z of the population thought that a couple should not hnve more
children if they cannot afford it.

The least favorable res"!)onse to that

idea uas found in Fortzleza ,'!here only 65% accepted it.

Fortaleza also

had the rreatest discre1_rnncy betNeen YT1ale and female cpinion · (69% for women,
60% for :r.1en).

It uas also found that the ooorest class was r.i.ost favorable to

the opposite notion--that one should have any mumber of children he pleases,
of money.
ree.ardless A. Eanchete attributed these results to the belief that many
children is a sign of virility of r:1en, and that for the poor, childr2n
represent hands to uorl: as uell as I'l.ouths to feetl, and are also a kincl of
old age insurance.

In spite of the Majority acceptance of far.iily planninp;

at an individual level, there is no such acceptance of a national effort
to reduce the population P,rowtl 1. re.te,

l :anchete reports in an article en

titled "Sterilization is Genocide" that "the najority of Srazilians react
unfavorably to the idea of a policy desir,nect to contain the so-called popu-

1 at i on exp 1 os i on ••• , 1158 I t i s a 1 so sue;r,este d t h at t h e movern.ent i n f avor of
birth control is propaganda fron the developecl. countries "so that the old
pouers uill not be surpassed demographically, nor have their prestipe
lessened by the appearance of new densely-populated countries.

115()

·

One could continue citing examples end studies, but most informative
of all, and most relevant ·to the Northeast, is an article by Fachel de
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Queiroz, one of the leading writers and r:1ost respected citizens of the
region.

Since the vieHs of a leading literary figurz not only reflect

but also help form pub).ic op~nicn, they are worth a ·hunc!ted po,11s for.'. findinp,
out what a community thinks.

Hence , 1e will quote extensively . 60

11

• • • I have ny prejudices ap:ainst birth control.
Hell, uhere
would I be if my parents and prandparent s had practiced that con
trol?"

" ••• from a national and hur.,an point of viell one can think of
many argu··.:c.nts ; uhich indicate that this kind of internation al
pressure they put on us to limit the birth of Brazilians, is not
only impertinent but also suspect."
·.,,;.a":: logic can there be in campaigning for the linitation
of natural-bor n Brazilians uhile we are tryinr. to increase popu
lation l-!i th European ir'lr:iip;rants? Does this nean that one,.~cvctts
to the old thesis of Count Gobineau, of Dr. Goebbels, and the
other racists, accordinP: to i1hom our r,eople is composed of
. degenerate r.1.estizos who should be replaced by white Europeans?"

"The entire Amazon is er.mty, deserted and unexplored. Phat
population does llato Grosso have in relation to its area--and
Goias, and Para and /lmapa ••• There is not a state in Brazil, not
even Ceara, uhich can be calle<l overpopulat ed."
"Brazil, contrary to the opinions of fickle friends and ni~
gardly benefactors , has plenty of space to plant and to graze herds
to sustain her children. Uhoever uants to help us, let them help
us in tl:is task and not take advantaf>e of our current difficultie s
to buy for a vile price that which ue produce."
" ••• uould Red China have the force and power to confront a
coalition of alr10st the uhole world, if it were not for the tre
mendous capital represented by her imMense ~opulation?
Let our people grow••• And do not preacI, national suicide for
fear of lack of food."
It would seem that population policy is advocated only by racists ln the
developed countries Hho desire national suicide for Brazil.

Sra. Queiroz's

highly-rega rded fiction contains some excellent social co~~ent, but unfortun•
ately her social comment, in this instance, contains some excellent fiction.
Furthermore , the poor Migrants uho leave the Northeast evidently consider
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it overpopulated and they do not usually head for the Ar.i.azon.
The vast Amazon uith its popul3tion density of less than one person
per square kilometer is usually offered as conclusive evidence that Brazil
has no population problem.

This is a popular fallacy--the Sahara Desert

has even feuer people per square kilometer, yet no one thinks it is under
populated.

Furthermore such a hostile environment as the Amazon is more

likely to be .conquered by educated, technically competent adults than by
t~e unlimited pror,eny of hune;ry illiterates.

But even if the Amazon were a

temperate fertile plain the relevant consideration is the rate of population
growth, not the absolute size or spatial density at a p:i.ven moment.

A rapid

increase in the quantity of people has opportunity costs in terms of the
quality of people.

If minimum quality standards are desired, one ,-,ay of

aiding the attainraent of these standards is clearly to slou donn the
quantitative increase.
lThis fallacy of lookinf only at density and neglectinr the rate ~f
increase is co~mitted in hiph places.*

President

Costa e Silva, in a letter

to Pope Paul praising the encyclical Humanae Vitae, says,
"In name of the people and government of Brazil I express to
Your Holiness the joy and rratitude occasioned by the encyclical
in Hhich the sup;rerne voice of the Church pives the appropriate
condemnation of the anti-Christian methods of birth control. As
leader of a country ~-1hich is sti 11 seekin8 to occul;)y 1:1ore than half of
its territory, and still exposed to the risks of a !)Opua tion
density which is incompatible uith the ~lobal necessitites of
development and security, I applaud this notable docuf!'!ent. I
applaud it not only because of our unshakeeble faith in the
Christian cof!'!mandments, but also as the strategic and moral
foundation of the policy follm·red by Brazil on the journey
toward r.1aterial and spiritual progress of her people, and as
a contribution to peace and harmony arnonp: nations." (Jornal do
Comerico 8/13/68.)
~Also, Riclu:.rd Nixon, before being elected Bresident, was quoted as saying,
!!:rhis, (population control) wculd bo a false position in this country, with
vast i:i:reas to·bo·colonhed ~; As a matter of fact, Brazil··needs to develop its,
natural resourc~s F.~d to increase its.birth rate, to increase the value of
its ot·m terriroty. ". ( ~ a l do Brasil, 5/14/67.)
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He have enoup,h information now to drB.~r some conclusions.

While the

arguments of section II in favor of po!)ulation control assume that the
goal is to maximize per capita (or better, modal) income, it is clear
that underlyinp, the views cited in section III is the goal of maximizinf
the pouer and pres tire of the nation--i. e. total incotrte, not per capita.
It is interesting that laissez-faire libertarians, ,,ho uant to leave
as much as po23ible of ...nconomi c lif e t o automati c regu·1 ation, have usually made
an eAception of population and pointed to dismal consequences if not
controlled.

61

Conversely, the planners and authoritarians have wanted to

control everythinr, but population.

1:arx' s contempt for Hal thus Fas almost

limitless, and liarxians have r,ererally considered socialist reform and
population control to be incompatible alternatives for lifting the pro
letariat.

This paradox is easily resolved by redrawinr: the cater,ories

along the more fundar:iental lines of individualism and collectivism.

Inc.li

vidualist libertarians want to protect the Forth of the sinp;le individual
from t;rn depreciation of emittiµg too many, as uell as from the discre
t:i.or..i,ry authority of the state.

Collectivists are I'lore interested in the

total, and one more individual usually adds to total power, in the sense
of increasing the herd.

In addition collevtivists prefer to deny the

possibility of improving one's own condition by individual action, and to
emphasize class solidarity an<l collective a.ction--vice versa for indivi
dualists.

Furthermore, a moderate number of persons can be treated individ

-ua.lly, but an immense number can only be dealt uith collectively.
the population explosion

Thus

fits in nicely uith both collectivist dogma and

with revoluntionary tactics of building up social pressures in underdeveloped
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countries .

For example, the Brazilian socialist journal Problemas da Paz

e do Socialism o reconstru cts e. scissor and paste "debate" among world
popualtio n experts, on the question "does the threat of overpopu altion exist?"
The negative clearly "uins" an<l the central theme is that "it is necessary
to defend the populatio ns fron capitalism , not capitalism from the popu
lations.11 62

One also hears the sloian "one more hungry child today Means

one more guerilla fighter tol'lorrow. "
1,ralthusia n Hriters of the classical school

have tended to eophn-

those implicatio ns of l!althus' theory which ~Jere unfavorab le to

sizq

social reform--e .g. redistrib ution of inco!lle to the poor uill only allou a

greater number of people to exist at the same niserable subsisten ce level,
and is therefore a bad policy.

This cor:!forts the conscienc e of the

rich

and for that reason has e;iven llalthusia nisr a bad name ~-rl.th 1-Iarxists
and some liberals.

There is, hmvever, a more radical inp lication of II.al thus'

basic insight, which can even be expressed in t:arxist

terms.

From Harx

we learn that capital is not a thinP but a social relation.
"• •• property in money, means of subsisten ce, machines and
other means of productio n does not as yet sta~p a nan as a
capitalis t if there be wantinr; the correlati ve--the Hape
worker, the other man nho is cor1pelled to sell hir:iself of his
oi-m free ui 11.
••• canital is not a thinr but a social relation be~l31een
persons, establish ed by the i~strume ntality of thinp;s. II
Likeuise mere ownership of land does not make a man a latifundi ario if
there be lacking the correlati ve, the subsisten ce agricultu ral laborer.

A

plentiful supply df "correlat ives" is a necessary condition for the Main
tenance

of a privilige d, propertie d class.

Also Arthur Leuis points out that

"the fact that the Hap;e level in the capitalis t sector depends upon
earnings in the subsisten ce sector is so~etimes of i~mense political
importanc e, since its effect is that capitalis ts have a direc interest
in holding down the productiv ity of the subsisten ce workers."

64
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Note thet Lewis' observ ation uould imply a conflic t betueen the indus
easily
trial capita list and the latifun diario --a confli ct, moreov er, which can
be avoided , since the capita list is interest ec1 only in holding do,-m the
marpin al
wages) .

prod:ic tivity (or average produc tivity, uhichev er governs subsist ence
This is also in the intere st of the latifun dario and is very simply

rate-
effecte d by allowin g the prolet ariat to live up to its name and prolife
the. more worker s, the lower the averar;e and marrin al produc t and the lower

the wage, and the less chance for conflic t between capita lists and latifun
diarios . To the extent that the correla tive prolet ariat becomes less
numerous the burden of the niggar dliness of nature must be borne in part
and
by the capita list and latifun diario who will have to pay higher wares
get along Hith fewer servan ts.

Thus preachi np: birth control to the prol

etaria t is an attack on the status quo, and has no relatio n to the apolo
getic side of Valthus ianism.

Althoug h Lenin ~-.ras opposed to "tleo-lf althusi 

anism" as a sccial policy, he uas in favor of free circula tion of birth
65 Thus is
contro l inform ation and the aboliti on of laws punishi ng abortio n.
it were tacti:·a .lly expec.i ent to suppor t birth contro l the commun ists could
build..
find textua l supµor t-but opport unistic revolu tionary tactics call "for
tive
ing up the pressu re of misery and divert ini attenti on from any alterna
to communist revolu tion.

Strang ely enough Hestern countri es are often

char~ed with hyproc risy ,.hen they advoca te ponula tion control to the
underde veloped countr ies.

But note that the Hestern countr ies themse lves in

s
this instanc e, practic e what they preach , uhile the Communist bloc preache
unlimi ted ~rowth , but practic es limitat ion at home.
in Hungary the abortio n rate exceed s the birth rate!

It is well known that
Pressur e for revolu tion

ng
from a high birth rate comes not only from number s but from the resulti
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age compositian as well.

A younger population is ~ore volatile and more

easily manipelated.
The llan:ian concept of the proletariat (the dispossessed industrial
worker dependent for ~is livelihood on tl'.e sale of his m-m labor power)
is relevant t::, the 11ortheast, but the original Roman sense (producers of
offspring for the republic) is far more accurate in characterizinp, the low
est class of Uorthcc1stern society.

12% of total cutput.

After all, industry accounts for only

FurtherTiore to apply a capitalist laN of "relative

surplus population" to an essentially precaµitalist society is very r:1Uch
against the cpirit of 11arx' s thought, in l7hich "every special historic t!lode
of production has its mm special laNs of population, historically valid
within its limits alone.

1166

The proletarian nordestinos are exploited

through their role in society analogous to a herd of livestock which
is valued only in tenns of its total size, not for the indiviclual l,ell
being of its r:1embers.

Hhile exploitation in the i:arxian sense has attracted

much sympathetic attention, "Roman exploitation" p;oes larrely unnoticed.

It

is not surprising that in the ilortheast Catholic clergymen with a social
conscience should tend to the left, since their dogma make it easier to
sympathize with a l1arxian proletariat than with a Roman one.
latter is more. congruent ,>11th Northeastern realities.

Yet, the

Exploitation via

ownership of the means of production is more obvious than exploitation via
the "m-mership" of the means of limiting reproduction,, but it is no more
effective, nor more dep;rading.

The mmership by the oligarchy of both the

means of production and the means of limiting reproduction,* leads to

*The "m£,a::1s of limitinP, reproduction" is more than just the availability
of contraceptives, although that is part of it. It must also include the
attainment of a cultural level sufficient to provide a minimum of understand
ing and motivation.
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Marxian and Roman exploitatio n simultaneou sly, with the result that the
proletarian population, like animal populations , is li~ited by its aggre~ate
wealth,

hile the upper class population has the distinctive ly hunan charact

i1

eristic of being li~ited by its standard of livinf,.
Farnan exploitatio n is also a much sounder theoretical conce!)t than lfarx
ian exploitatio n, since the latter is all tangled up ~iith the labor theory of
value, while the former depends for its operation only on the lau of supply
and demand, and on the solid fact that the lm·.'er class is nore prolific.
That Farx himself (as opposed to the Harxists) had some synpathy for the
notion of Roman exploitatio n is seen the follouing quotations.
"The reproductio n of a mass of labor-pouer , which must incessantly
re-incorpor ate itself with capital for that capital's self expansion;
which cannot get free from capital, and whose enslavement to capital
is only concealed by the variety of individual capitalists to Hhom
it sells itself, tt. s renroductio n of labor-pm1er foros, in fact, an
essential of the reproductio n of capital itself. Acg~tTJmulation of
capital is, therefore, increase of the proletariat ."
"In fact, not only the number of births and deaths, but also the
absolute size of families, stand in inverse µroportion to the heipht
of wages, and therefore to the amount of neans of subsistence of which
the different categories of laborers dispose. This lau of capitalisti c
society uould sound absurd to savages, or even to civi1 ized colonists,
It calls co mind the boundless reE 8oduction. of animals individuall y
weak and constantly hunted doun."
The last sentence also calls to nind the theory of Josue de Castro,
writer on Northeaster n problems and nutrition expert, that the natural res
ponse of a species tfuose existence is threatened is to increase its reprod
uction rate--the doubtful physiolop:ic al mechanist11 beinr, the.t protein deficien· · 69
cy, up to a po i nt, i ncreases f erti· 1 ity.

The collectivis t emphasis (usefulness to the republic) in the concept
of Roman exploitatio n can be better understood by constantly bearing in
mind that all members of the collective are not equal.

The olir,archy and
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the public opinion class in the Hortheast already practice birth control.
As we have seen, the fact that the masses c.!o not means that there will
always be a plentiful supply of labor at low uages for the development of
the oligarc~y' s industry, and to work on the olirarchy' s fazendas, and to
furnish servants for the oligarchy's homes and babas to care for the
oliearchy' s children.

Nor should ue overlook the fact that land values

tend to rd.se with population, ·s:o that the land-mming class enjoys a
capital gain as Hell as cheap labor.

An important coMplement to birth

control Hould be a land tax, especially a tax on idle land, uhich would
have the double advantage of encourap;inp, its productive use and lowering
its price, thus discourar,ing the speculative, unproductive investment in
land which is so conmon in inflationary countries.

Also, revenue from the

tax coulcl be used for schools to teach illiterates (some ei~hty per cent of
the population), and to finance birth control education.
Rachel de Queiroz says " ••• the poor have children because the poor
have the good sense to understand that children are wealth."

70

She means

wealth for the poor, which is true in a sense--but there is a rnore signif
icant sense in uhich children of the poor are wealth for the rich, who
procure their services at subsistence uap:es.

If the oliP.archy should suffer

an attack of conscience they can apply the opiate of traditional Roman
Catholicism to their oun discomfort as well as to the bi~th pains of the
proletariat.

Like Narxian exploitation, Roman exploitation is not the

..
.
.

'

..'
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' ~<f:.'

the conscious intent of evil people.i<

The olie>archy does not hold

rneetin~s end formally vote to obstruct poT)ulation policy.

*The tern "Ronan exploitation" has several justifications. First
the literal Ancient ?sot'1an sense of the uord "proletariat," already
discussed. Second, the conscious lin,itation of fanily size by J:.or!lan
patricians (See Sidney Coontz, op. cit. fn. 18, chp. 7). Third, and
r.iore recently, the treditional P.or<1an Ca.tholic opnosition to birth control,
uhich Protestants have often rerarded as sin11ly a stratery to outnumber
then. Also, see Sch,ard Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the '?.oman Empire,
Chc>.pter 2, "the source of forei1m supplies (of slaves) floued Pith much less
abundance, and the Ronans uere reduced to the r:ilder but P1ore tedious method
of pro!)ar,ation. In their nur:Jerous fanilies, and particularly in their
country estates, they encoura~ed the marria,se of their slaves. 11 Encourapinp:
the nroparation of '\,are slaves" is still an 2ttractive nolicy for oliparchs.
Although he did not use tr.e term, the idea of PoT"lan exnloitc1tion tJas
so clearly described by A.D. Tlolfe in hts brilliant article, "The Fational
ization of Production and Peproduction", that his folloT·Yin('l' ~-rnrds may Pell
serve as a definition of cite concept.
"Church and state Pere determined that contraceptive infornation
should be wi tthe ld fro,· the woT"len of the louer classes, ,·hose unremi ttinr labor Fas e·ssential to the developr1ent of British ex;)ort trade.
Refusal of the rip-ht to this inforr:1ation iT"plied, of course, that
peo!)le r,,ere not to be perT"litted to put any rational barrier between
legitimate sex ir1nulse and its 'natural' outcorie in hi()'h natality. The
sex desir.e r:ras nade tbe a!"e!'lc~, of involuntary maternity anc1 put into
the service of the state and of capitalistic industry, uith a callous
brutality ~,hich even the Eriperor P.u~ustus had not ventured L1 his
famous Lex Papia et Popuea." (A.E. Folfe_,,in r~.E. Himes, eel., Economics,
Sociolorv and tl'e l'odern T~orld, !:arvarcl Press, 1935, T). 228.)

J:t is also si3nificant that the roots of the traditional Roman
Catholic position on marriage and contraception are mainly non-Bi!Hical,
coming from Roman law (the purpose of marriage is procreation) and Roman
philosophy (the Stoic rejection of sexual pleasure). The oft-cited
"sin of Onan" (Genesis 38) was his disobedience to his father and his
non•fulfillment of the Jewish lau of the levirate -- not his practice
of coitus inter:ruptus. For a fascinating historical study of the
Roman Catholic position on contraception, see John F. Noonan, J,r.,
Contraception, (Harvard University Press 1965).

-37-

TLe reaction is more visceral tlwn conscious.

l'arx uas at least half

right uhen he said that man's social consciousness is deterr-1ined by his
place in society.

If nationalists, the far left, the festive left, anc

the zenophobes rail against international r:iovernenta favorlnp- l·irtb control-trell, tbat is rather conveninet for the olif;arclly. 1:

Anc1 let us not

forp:et that so far the olir,archy has successfully resisteci land refot-r1
and incoI"1e and l7ealt1° taxes.

Perhaps they are sufficiently attatchec to

their short-run interests to resist birth control propran1s for the poor
as uell.
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Poxes penerally advocate larr-e farilies for. r1:1bbits.

f.n interes tinp- his toricnl paral le 1 can be ,1.?.~e l,etHeen the attitudes
of the present day '.:;razilian nationalists and oliv~rchs, and those
seventeenth century English nationalists, t',e r;e-rcantilists.
E,S. Furniss' excellent study s Tl~e Position

Follo•Yinr,

of the Laborer in a

System of NationalisM, \-re can easily see hat·' the national r>oals of
the mercantilists led to t:ie desire for a larp.e proletariat.

The nore

workers the nore coulcl Le produced for export and the riore easily it
could be solcl since i:rare costs anc:1 -:,rices Pere l,einr lieh1 clo,-m by the
freat supply of Horkers, uho of course die: not consur:ie ir'oorts .~bove barest

*This stran<?"e coalition of traditional Catholics, ;·lationc'l.lists,
Marxists, and Olip-archs becm'.1es even stranrrer if T,e consi:-1er the specific
opposition to the IUD, because it nm1 inclu~es the lRrre nanufacturers of
the older more expensive contraceptives. It fa sirnificant that t!1e IUD,
Hhich is the contrc~cepti ve most anplicable to the !'1.:=tsses, is outlawed,
uhile the more expensive Pills nre freely sold. It seet"s that contra
ception is only for the rich.
(See Glycon de Paiva, Jornal do Cor1ercio,
12/18/68). In the United States ns late of 1910 r<2r1•aret Sanper (lfy
Fieht for Birth Control) tells of noor Fo~en ben-fin~ her to tell then the
secret of the ricb for havinr few.children. The bitter opposition· to
}'rs, Sanger is a I'!c'.tter of record. In refereri.ce to such opposition Ezra
Bowen (/>n Hypothesis. of Populntion Grm,rth) c0Drr1ents that, "It is cifficult
to exagp:erate the bitterness and enerpy ~-1i th Fhich anti-intelliren ce
activities are carried out by agencies opposed to liberatinp the louer
orders of nankind fro!!l the bitinp. lash of the Hhip of b1:lre necessity,"

necessity.

The desired result of a larpe balance of trade surr,lus (which

r1as considered the true Health of a. nation) was t~us insured by a nurierous
proletariat.

Hence the conclusion so natural to the y,,ercantilist and so

stranpe to nodern ears, that to have a Healthy nntion: it is necessary to
ha.ve very larr:e numbers of very poor people.

In the clear Horris of Peter

Chamberlen, (quoted in Furniss, p. 25);
"This nay be a note to ell Men, especially to states~en to
lool~ no more upon the poor as a burde!!. but as the richest treasure
.of a nation, if orderly and uell-er1ployecJ. Fhich is the more
rr!anifest if He consider first, that thour:h they nultiµly more
rapidly than the rich yet they do not only feed and clothe ther-J
selves but the rich men are fei'. and clothed anc. Protr rich by ~1hat
they ~et out of the poor' s labor over and above their rc1aintenance,
Secondly, that the poor bear a preater burGen of taxes in the city
and elsetihere. For tre rich either abate ubat they ret out of the
poor's labor or (Phich is vorse) permit them to starve for want of
employment."
The major point of sirilarity between the T'.lercantilists and the
Brazilian nationalists (of the ri~ht or left) is tbat tt:ey arc both
nationalists, little influenced by the libertarian individualist premises
(biases) of modern economics.

Tl1 e national poal of tbe mercantil:l.st

uas to maxinize a balance of trade surplus, Hhile that of the Brazilian
nationalists is to maximize the rate of p:rowth of the T'.!Oc1ern ce.pitalistic
industrial sector of their economy.

To achieve this latter end invest~ent

and profits must be hirrh and consunption low, vhlch in turn leads ton
policy of loo uap:es p,uaranteed by many ~mrLers.

Furniss trenchantly

remarks that for the nationalist, "it is the forl".1 of economic p,oods, r..ot
their value in a competitive market, uhich gives wealth its sip,nific.e.
So considered, national llealth is co!'lposed cnly of that part of the economic
goods within the country uhich is serviceable, directly or indirectly, in
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in prosecuting group aims ,m<l purposes."

For the nineteenth century

English nationalists the desirable form of wealth uas a balance of
t~ade surplus in r-old, for the t,rentieth century Drazilian nationalist
the desirable forn is nodern capitalistic industry--for both a larp;e
proletariat is a means to the end.

The ends hav~ in common that in

their historical contexts both are considered the crucial inp-redient of
national power.
The concept of Rm,ian exploitl:l.tion is su~r,ested., even advocated, by
the Northeast Erazilian Hriter quoted below, •rho also ~ives evidence
supporting earlier assertions about class ~ifferences in reprofuction-
evidence from. a. source uhich cannot be susoected of harborinp a bias in

favor of birth iontrol.
"the contribution of this class (the bourgeoisie) to clerr1ographic
development is ridiculously small."
"the middle cle.ss ••• is in revolt against and asphyxiated by
the process of proletarianizc1.tion ••• which it resists bravely, if
unprolificaliy. And when a r,regr.ancy involuntarily occurs..:some
members of the middle class resort to the weapon of Herod ••• "
"Only tht:! lower class or proleteriat produces. And it pro
duces scandalously, abnormally. Office-bound scholars are perhaps not aPare that these men TTbo receive rninimur:: salaries,
starvation uages, are offering a great contribution to the nation •• ,.
tHo Brazilians per year, (sic.) on a per couple basis, one in
January and one in December."
"Phile 1ecop,nlzin3 the financial anpuish in i1hich the prolet
ariat ver>,etates, and the marr;inilization in uhich it is sunk, I
believe it to be imr.i.orc1.l to advise a creature of that tvne to prac
birth control, I uelieve it is a preat transParession against
the laws of F.,an and God to sup-~est anticonceptional nractices to
men i:1ho do nc;_thing_ nore than uork and sleen. They are lil~e the
lilies of the fie1'.d, and the birds of tr.e heevens,, .they are born,
rrm-1, imd prccluce, having fe.i
tr.at Cod uill p,ive theI'l clothing
in conformity with the cold."
(Py emphasis),

72

This writer talks c,bout the lm,s of God and the lilies of the field,

but really he is saying ,-1hat Peter Chamberlen said, that men do nothing but
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work and sleep are handy

creatures , and ue should keep the nation ( i. e ~

the oligarchv ) uell suppll.ed ui th themJ
There are people in ::.he Northeast Hho courageou sly aJvocate populatio n
policy--p erhaps doctors more than econoMist s. liot1ever, P.ubens Costa,
presidnet of the prestigio us Eanl: of the l•iortheas t, has lieen cited r.iany ti.Mes.

In his oreface to a disc~~sio n of populatio n policy, he says that the
subject is
" ••• charp,ed with enotion and controver sy due to the inar-equat e
presentat ions of people t1ho have not thourht aliout the matter and
have not taken the trouble to inforn theri.selve s 'before voicing opinions,
and by others ~,ho, for uncon.fess able motives seel: to cre.<ite an uproar
and generate an atmo sphe 73 im Jropi tious to construct ive, serious,
O~y em!JhBsis) .
and hip:!1-l"'linded deba'.:.e."
1

Heedless to say the population . question is not United to the lfortheast ,

or to Brazil, or to the third uorld.

It is a world µrobler. Phose solution

is 1:-reatly obstructe d by the nationali st ment2.lity of all countries , as
1
uell as by the racial and class divisions Pi.thin countries , e.p. Elac :

National ist oopositio n to birth control in the United States.

The

populatio n explosion is 2.lso the r.iaj or reason for the ~dd2ning r;ap in the
per capita in.::ones of rich and roar nations ~nd it is therefore not sur
prisinr to find sinilar effects on class diverr.;enc es uithin nations or rer:ions.
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llo other index divides the world so sharply into "develo~e d" and

•~underdev eloped" as does fertility .
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This section has inv,:ilved more polemics than some uill thin!~ becoming
to a "value-fr ee" social scientist .

But since our objective economic

analysis led us to expect wide acceptanc e of popualtio n policy, it became
necessary to explain its vehef"!ent rejection on another level of discourse ,
clearly labeled "ic.eologi :::al.

11

The distinctio n between "positive " and
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think in~.
"norm ative" thoug ht is an eleme ntary rule of clear

But the

think .er--i t is not a
distin ction belon gs in the mind of the indiv idual
s, much less betwe en
sound basis for divis ion of labor betHe en indiv idual
J?rofe ssions .
IV.

on "Chri stian
Some concl uding ri'\fle ction s. - It is a sad cor:m1entary

fruit ful, nulti ply, anrl
civili zatio n" thai.: the Old Testam ent corma nd to "be
manki nd has un
reple nsih the earth " is the only Bibli cal injun ction
rthele ss it is possi ble
ambig uously lived up to--an d that ad absurc1ut:'.• 1-leve
to hope that this uill chang e.

The Catho lic Churc h is noN deepl y divid ed

irnat ion of tradi t
on the quest ion of birth contr ol, and the Pope' s reaff
a schis n.
ional doctr ine Hill more likely provo ke than avert

Ohlin is

perha ps not overl y opthl i3tic when he obser ves that,

i

impor tant
"Poli tical opr,o sition to birth contr ol remai ns an
this subje ct
on
ine
doctr
facto r, but t1::e rccas idera tion of Catho lic
also pos
is
it
and
is nowhe re more intc~1 Se than in Latin Ameri ca,
notio n
eous
erron
an
sible that thils oppos ition has been found ed on
a vocal
when
acy
of popul ar attitu des and ·will chan8 e to 7gvert advoc
demand for govern :r::ent actio n is heard ."
then so is
If liwiti ni:: birth s by artif icial means is "unna tural"

lonp: this simpl e
limit ing death s by artif icial means --one uonde rs hou
logic can be avoid ed.

n
If one escap es this contr adict ion in ad hoc fashio

ase life, then one lands
by defin ing "natu ral" as anyth ing tendin p to incre

in the worse predic,<1.mc;:,.+;

of defin ing "life " in some impli cit quan titati ve

sense of the numbe r of c--;:sganisms under goinr: t!letab olism.

In any case the

ecolo gy, not repro d
more relev ant "natu ral la~·1s" are those of popul ation
and the oli~a rchy
uctiv e physi ology . Catho lics as uell as the far left
popul ation polic y is
shoul d be vigor ously challe np,ed on the issue , since
to collec t:f.vis t revcurre ntly the most viabk indiv idual ist altern ative
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olutton in the third uorld, and the Communists know this very ,,1ell. *
The United States should not be so spinelessly timid about emphasizing
birth control as a part of foreip,n aid on at least the same level as fiscal
and land refonn.

The idea of Roman exploitatio n should be stressed as a

more relevant cause of backwardnes s a.nd social injustice than Farxian
exploitatio n.

Population control and social reform are not incompatibl e

means for lifting the masses.

They are quite complementary (often mutually

dependent} and the far left's denial of this obvious fact is the clearest
possible indication that their irmnediate aim is the building up of
pressures for Revolution (that modern Armapeddon leading to the secular
millenium) regardless of the human costs.**

*Cf. l'!arxi9t ecooornist R. L. t1eek. 1:arx and Ensels on Hal thus, Lawrence
and tlishart, London, 1953, p. 47. "If tbe soclal strup!>les of the early
nineteenth century were essentially summed up in the controversy between
!-~althus and P.icardo, those of our own times are perhaps not unfairly
summed up in that between Malthusians and Marxians."
**Cf. Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy, pp. 117~18.
"Ortho<lox Cathclicism and orthodox Narxism agree in protesting that
there is no such thinp- as a population !)roblem (though both seem to
be softeninp; their attitude a little in recent times). It would be
possible to understand the religious argument if it ran thus: 'The
explosion of population nm-, goins on is causinp; great, misery in very
many lives, and preventinp. very nany froM attaininp to modest comfort.
But contraceµtio n is a sin. It is wronf'. to help others to commit sins
(even when they are not Christians) and avoidinp misery is no excuse!
Religious people, however, do not generally like to put so hie;h a price
on virtue; they prefer to pretend that there is no proble111.! I-Tith every
mouth God sends a pair of hands.' True, but he does not send a
combine-ha rvester: As for the Marxists, one .cannot but sua ect that
the know better, and rave some reason for not sa ine so.'
Hy empha
sis.

Although there is no conflict between social reform and family

planning, there is a conflict bewween the 1-'arxist's and the oligarchy's
reasons for opposing birth control. The llarxist wants revolution

and the oligarchy wants the status quo,

Unlimited population growth
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Hhile it is possible to hope th.at the Northeast is on the threshold
of a new developmental epoch, and that eventually population µolicy will
be accepted, He r:mst recopnize witl: Ohlin that,
" ••• probably the rnce ap,ains t time is nore urrent than that
ai:ainst space ••• Given time, there is no doubt that the world economy
could accommodate populations several times larp:er than the present
ones. In tirile, the capital r.1ay be formed; in time, the necessary
social reforms Hill be undertaken. But as thinps stand the developin~
world faces a transitional period of uncertain lenrth in which time
ui 11 be exceedinply short. Hor tali ty wlll continue to decline, and
population increases at rates which will absorb the bulk of the
resources that could otherwise be deployed to !'leet the irrepressible
demand for modernizatio9 and developMent. l''illions will be born out
7
of phase with history. 11
nowhere is this more true than in lTortheast :Sn:i.zil.

l\nc noHhere

is birth control more virorously resisted.

id: -

c,.nt'd.

cannot serve contradictory r.oals. In the 1.Jortheast it seet!ls to
me that population grmrth is more likely to serve the status quo than
revolution, since it maintains the masses in a state of hoi:>eless,
impotent poverty. Revolution is caused by ideas, not poverty. The
middle class students are the revolutionary force, not the masses. These
revolutionary stuclents IT'ay exhort the masses to produce r:i.ore hunpry
children today in order to have more guerrilla fiphters t0Morrm1, but
they certainly practice birth restriction the~selves (by contraception
or late marriar,e) because that is all that keeDs most of then from
sinkinp, into the proletariat--it is what pives thci' the Margin of enerpy
and resources over bare subsistence to devote to revolution. But the
intellectual revolutionary feels that the proletariat can be made to do
the fir,htinp.. Everyone wants a proleteriat to do his dirty world
Of course a good liarxist can "resolve" this contradiction by apµeal
dialectic--at some criticnl point continuous quantitative chan3e
the
to
produces a discontinuous qualitative chanp.e. /1.t some critical number
the herd i-1ill becorr.e umranageable and trample the herdsman. Jiaybe so,
but I doubt·it.
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Althoufh it is ir~possitl e to I!'ake accurc'lte calculatio ns with such
inaccurat e date, we can neverthel ess sharpen a fet-1 notions, shorr the
lo~ica.l relations a!'lonP- our main variables , a::1.c:1 r.-ake sure that our various
numerical estinates , uhen taken together, do not lead to absurditi es or
r,ross inorobab ilities.
First consider the ryro1Jable distribut ion of incoT'.",e 2.nd division of
classes in the Northe.9.s t, as shoun belor>,

Probable fistributi on of Income in 1-lortheast I.razil

Frequency

'

Per capita
income class

Louer

class

Upper
class

Line AB separates the sl~ewed distribut ion into tim sub-distr ibutions,
the upper and louer classes.

Each class obeys a different lat,1 of populatio n

-51r,routh.

The louer class is lirnited by its ap;grePate Health, the upper
for each sub-distributio n (especially the

class by its standard of livinr.

lower class) the mean C1e) is a rood aTJproxim.?tion to the mode (l"o).

For

the t!h -le distribution the node is approxir'!ated by the lm-rer class nean.
Over one generation (25 years) the lo\ier class increases by a factor of
4(8 children divided by 2 parents), the upper class by a factor of
2(4 children divided by 2 barents).*
To see this r.ore clearly, consider hou a population r-rows, under the
averap.e are of oarents at childbirth is 25; each

followinp assun1ptions:

couple has 4 children (Fho all survive to have children); everyone dies at
ape

50.

This ryor,ulation ~Jill p-row as shoon belou, Hhere the number in

parenthesis represents age (0

= children,

25

= T.'arents,

50

= frandparents),

and the number outside the pe.renthesis is the nuTiiber of people of that
particular are.
,.time
1
2 (O)
. ,r·

descendants

,-2 (25)

7

_5_

4

...1....

2

2 (50)

I____ _
_j

4(50)

lf(25)

I

!

8(0) :-- 3(25)-1 8(50)
I
12.,._ ~ -

I

2L,

16(0) · 116·(25)-\

16 (50)

J

32 (25)

'---·---1
48

132(0)
- a~•

32 (SO)

::w

This population, consistinp of children anc1 parents (see rectan9:les)
clearly doubles every 25 years--this doubling fa~tur r~presentinp, the pro~
portion of c.hildren to parents, ,!,
2

l:ote that TTe could include p;ran<l-

*

(see next page)

r:,. t\;
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'i ,,

, r
;
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'

parents (and as· r1~.ny sirr.ultaneously livinp- renerations as
total population still doubles every 25 years.

'le

~rish), and the

l;or tuo sinultaneously livinr:

generations the r,opulation at til"e perioc: n is riven by (2°

+

2n-l),

The total incone of each clc>ss, r,ro~!inr- at G. 5% annuci.lly, •1ill increase
by a factor of 4. 2- 11er .rreneratior-,

Therefore., louer class per capita income

uould increase by a factor of 4.8= 1.2 ner '.'.'eneration, ~,hile uprer class
4
ner capita income increases by a factor of 4.S= 2.4. /lllo•Yini:r for the
2
stronr likelihood thnt lower clc>.ss totc1l incor.ie f1rm· 1 s at less than, anc:1.
ur,>Per class total incor-1e at r.ore tb,1,n the assurecl 6.5% c1nnually, ne nay
consider l~rer class ner canite incore as constant (or nossibly decreasinR),
and upper class per caTJita incore as increasinr Ly r ore than 2.4 til'les ner
1

reneration.

In terrs of the a!:,ove c1is trilution diagran, the lo•1er class

part of the curve shifts vertically up~!ard by a factor of 4 every i::-enerat
ion, while horizontally it rer.~ains constant or t'laybe even shifts a bit to
the left,

The uoner class part of the curve shifts vettically urmard by a

factor of 2 ?.nd horizontally rir,11tFard by a factor of 2,4 per o-eneration.

\
j

Consequently, over tine the const.?.nt fllode becor 1 es ,.,ore and nore "r.oc:1.al"-
i, e,, more and ~ore representative of the total ponulation.

(

It is in~erestin;' to try to TJut all of our variables and num•rtcal

I

estimates topether in a sinple nicture anc:1 see hrn; they h~nr torether,

I

do this ue may use the folloPinp: "compoun<l interest" relationship.,ir,,,-

I

(y •

P)l/P

=

1 +

To

D

~-,here n is the reproduction ratio, or rou..-bly the nurr1J-.er of children r:ivirled

*from nrevious pace
Eacl! class is for norJ assur:ed to consist entirely of identical fan
liies t~rpical of that class. 1\lso the estir,ates o-£ 4 e.nr! fl children refer
to those uhich survive infant r.ortality. The nuf'.'ber of births T•ould be
greater, es~ecially for the lmrer class.
,'d:See llP.nnes Hyrenius, "Population f'ro.,tl: ant~ T'enlacenent" in !:luncan
and Hauser, eds., The Studv of Ponulation.
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)
I

by the number of parent s, g is the len?;tr of

a

penera tion, or the mean age

of mother s at childb irth, y is the reptodu cing popula tion as

P.

percen tage

of
of the total popula tion, and pis the annual percenta p.:e rate of crowth

I

the total popula tion.
Applyi nf the above relatio n to both the upper and loner class pop

I

I

I
I'

ulation s, and takirw. a t·reipht ed geonet ric mean of the tuo resulti n3 annual
~rowth rates, leacs to to the folloPir ..g fort:)ula .
=

Lop ti

TT

log (y. R)l/r +

E

w1

log
1

cv 1

• TI) 1 ,~

1

= lop; (1

p)

H+U

p:eoI'le tri c mean of upper c>.nd lmver cle.ss i:!roT1th rates.

H
E

= \reighte d

w

= louer class as propor tion of total popula tion

1

+

class as p!I'.'oportion of total po-rula tion

w

= upper

y

the
= reprodu cing popula tion as propor tion of tiliole po,ula tion, for
louer class

y

1

the
= reprodu cing popula tion as nropor tion of ,hole popula tion, for
upper class
far.1ilie s
= repcrod uction ratio for popula tion of typica l louer class

R

Rl"" reprodu ction ratio for popula tion of typica l upper class familie s
= lenr,:th of a genera tion in years, lm,er class

g
g
p

1

=

length of a renera tion in years, upper class

=

rate of the total popula tion (upper and
_,
annual percent ar,e Prowth
lower classes )
Here ue have a list of the importa nt variab les of our analys is, for

most of which we have rough numeri cal estiMa tes.
p is 3.1%.

Accord inp to census data

Other cstirr.a tcs run hip:her , and we sau that with fallin i

death rates and constan t birth rates, p i1lll approac h 4%.

About all ire

ly
can say with confide nce is that p is more tr:an 3% and less than 4%, probab
closer to 3% than to 4%.

From v, y, R, and r: Fe can conpute an indepen dent

our
estima te of p which should also coBe out sof!'.et-1here around 3 to 4% if

-54indiv idual nu~er ical estim ates are reaso nable .
1
respe ctr. and R have been discu ssed previ ously and taken as 4 and 2,
ively .
casua l obser vatio n.
He have taken gas 25 years , nore or less based on
a study by Virpt. -1ia
Inform ation on g is sur1Jr isinp- ly hard to get, but
, nrese nts data
Rodgi ?uez 1' of the Centr o Latino ari.eri cano de I'ell'or >:rafia
:e nuMte r of child 
for .Arge ntina, Parap. uay, and Chile , shoHin ,7 the averap
ren per mothe r by are proup and educa tional level .

Ic,y interp olatio n in

rs corres pondi nr- to
her table s and diagra ms one can find the aqe of nothe
Nomen past child beari ng
the Mid-p oint of the avera pe nud,e r of child ren for
age.

ilOl:\an of a certa in
In other uords , if the total nur,,be r of child ren a

of that class has her
class has is 5, then let us see at uhat a.['.e a wonan
third child , and tal~e that ap.e

.'.lS

2n estin 2te of !°'•

The ran~e appea rs

aroun d 30 for educa ted
to be from about 23 for unedu cated nrpen tinian s, to
educa terl Chile ans,
Argen tinian s, from about 26 to 27 for unedu c2.tec ancl
l'ortR ra

Parar, uayan s.
and fron about 26 to 30 for educa ted and unedu cated

26 years . i:,'< These are
state s that the lenp-t h of a pener ation in Brazi l is

sugp;e st tbat our estir-1 ate
rouph estit" 'ates based on tincer tain data, but they
of f

= 25 or 26 is reaso nable .

T,Je uill treat p

Let

us follou 1'lcrta ra and take

~

=

26.

= f 1 althou gh an up9er class r,ener atiori is proba bly longe r

than for the louer class (mean inr that

\·Je

have proba bly under statec class

differ ences in rate of repro ducti on).

," !lay, 196 7, serie
*"Fec undid ad l'ifer encia l Se pun 1-!ivel de Instru ccion
C, no. 97, CELP.DE, Santi aro, Chile .
, 194 7-48.
'~*Gio rp,io Forta ra, Revis ta Brasi leira de Estad istica

-ss1
and poo r, we y,,ay p-et a clue from
For w and u , the prop ortio PS of rich
erat e--1 5% ann ns%, resp ecti vely .
the prop orti ons of lite rate and illit
as lite rate , but prac tica lly no rich
Sinc e ther e are sorr:e poo r uho qua lify
1
e.
w = 90% and w = 10%; as cior esti mat
qud Hyi ng .::is ~ill itera te, we will take
pop ulat ion (fe!! lale) whic h neve r
y repr esen ts the perc enta r,e- of the
rniin ed by the deat h rP.te befo re re
repr odu ces, and is orin cipa lly clete
bacy rate duri nr repr odu ctiv e age.
prod ucti ve ape and the perm anen t celi
d
ber of chil dren per fam ily Here base
Sinc e our esti r1at es of nver ape num
y (one year old) ue wou ld like to
on chil dren surv ivin ? infa nt r1or talit
say
year old uill die befo re reac hinp ;,
konw wha t perc enta re of fem ales ona
ivc. l tabl e prep ared by G. i'ort ara*
20 year s of ape. Acc ordi np to a surv
side rs
Sao Paul o in 1930 -32 (,1hi ch he con
this figu re ,-mu ld be abou t 15% for
y
arou nd 1956 ). The pern anen t celi bac
indi cati ve for Bra zil as a uho le for
pe of T)eo ple ove r 50 uho are sing le
rate can be esti mat ed as the perc entn
ed Uati ons firu res* * this rate ,,as
(nev er ~ar ried ), and acco rdin r to Unit
e prec enta P,es rive s roup hly 30% of
13.1% for Bra zil in 1950 , Add inr thes
t 10;~ ,-1hich do. Thu s, our crud e
fem ales ~,ho do not repr odu ce, or abou
esti mat e is y = o.7.
ula ,-·e have ,
Plug p;inr - thes e valu es into the form
Lor, l!

and 1:g == 1

?

= 90 lo~

(.7 x 4)

1126 + 10 lor. (.7 x 2) 1126

100

+ p = 1. 0376 or p

4%."
= 3. 76%, uhic h is "bet ueen 3 and

of
not prov e that our gues s-es tir.1 ates
This very rour ,h corr espo nden ce does
rs
plen ty of ro0111 for com pens atinf , erro
R, w, y, anc r, are corr ect- -the re is
and sen siti vity que stio ns.

con trar y
He have mer ely fail ed to prov e the

and Stru ctur e of Bra zil's Pop ulat 
*Gi orgi a llon tara , "The Deve lo!)r r.ent
Glen 
ngle r and Dun can, eds. Free Pres s,
ion, " in Den ogra phic Ana lysi s, Spe
coe, Illi noi s, 1956 , p. 663.
ial Sta tist ics, 1963 , p. 63.
* 1'Uni ted llati ons Conp endi um of Soc

-56hypothesis that our estimates have lop,ical implications uhich are nrosslv
inconsistent uith census data.

An attempted refutation of our conject

ures has failed, therefore our confidence in them is increased someHhat.

